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State Taxation of Interstate Travel: Alternative Constitutional
Limitations-Northwest Airlines v. joint City-County Airport
Board
In today's context of expanded human mobility, an individual's right
to travel from,' through,2 or to3 any of the United States without state
restriction on4 or regulation of5 his admission- or departure7 enjoys
well-settled constitutional protection originating from two distinct
sources. The interstate transportation of persons is governed by the
commerce clause8 under which state power to regulate and tax the
admission and departure of interstate passengers is restricted, but not
entirely forbiddenf Furthermore, the right to travel is a recognized
privilege or immunity of citizenship 0 which is afforded absolute im-
munity from state infringement" under the fourteenth amendment.' 2
1 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
2 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 768 (1966).
3 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
4Id.
5 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
6 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
7 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
8 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. See Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941); United
States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 423 (1919); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491
(1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge
Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 218 (1894); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 112 (1890);
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885).
9 ". . . the States are not wholly precluded from exercising their police power in
matters of local concern even though they may thereby affect interstate commerce."
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) (holding exclusion of indigents not a
proper exercise of police power). See California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113 (1941).
1o Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
11Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., - Mont. -, 463
P.2d 470 (1970). See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (concurring
opinion), stating that a state may not restrict entry of indigents; Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), holding that a state may not restrict egress of persons
by hired carrier; and The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1848), indicating that
states may not restrict ingress of foreign immigrants.
12 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 768 (1966). See Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 97 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Slaughter House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74, 79 (1872). But see United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281,
299 (1920), attempting to limit the right to travel to a journey to the seat of national
government. This view was regarded as dictum by Douglas, J. concurring in Edwards
v. California.
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An historical lack of judicial unanimity exists over which of these
overlapping doctrines should control the efforts of a state to tax an
interstate traveller passing within its borders. The United States Su-
preme Court once declared that the proper vehicle for limiting this
restrictive taxation was the commerce clause."a Its subsequent decisions,
however, have not supported such a unitary view.14
The Montana Supreme Court, in the recent case of Northwest Air-
lines v. Joint City-County Airport Board,15 declared a one dollar em-
planing tax unconstitutional because it violated the interstate passenger's
fundamental constitutional right to travel. A state enabling statute 6
had authorized localities to collect the tax from an interstate airline.
The court viewed the levy as a restriction on the passenger.' 7 The case,
decided without application of the commerce clause, denied the state
the power to impose a tax that restricts entry into and departure from
its territory.18
The concept of the right to travel as a sphere of individual freedom
protected from state infringement was an integral part of the Articles
of Confederation. 9 Though denied express mention in the Constitution,
this right was early held by the Supreme Court to be a basic attribute
of national citizenship.2" The leading case of Crandall v. Nevadd2l had
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See cases cited note 8 supra.
'4Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
768 (1966).
15 - Mont. -, 463 P.2d 470 (1970).
16 MONT. CODE REv., ch. 1, § 829-32 (1947).
17- Mont. -, see 463 P.2d 470 (1970).
18 Id.
19 Articles of Confederation, Art. IV.
20 Following the only partially successful alliance created under the Articles of
Confederation, the constitutionally founded efforts to create a stronger federal union
continued into the first half of the nineteenth century. Under Article IV, § 2, of the
United States Constitution, this union was held to have conferred on its citizens
greater rights by virtue of general national citizenship than individual states could
confer. See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF TM UNITm STATES
§§ 1804-06 (5th ed. 1891). Article IV of the Articles of Confederation had provided that
the "people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other
State." See THE FmDERuisr, No. 42 (Hamilton). While this right finds no explicit
mention in the Constitution, the reason has been suggested that "a right so elementary
was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union
the Constitution created." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
See L. CHAFEE, TIIREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION or 1787 185 (1956). See
also United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920) (argued in terms of individual
intervention).
The rights considered fundamental to the citizens of all free governments were
[Vol. 5:157
19701 RECENT DECISIONS
permanently engrafted the right to travel on the developing fabric of
nineteenth century constitutional law before the passage of the four-
teenth amendment.2  Crandall applied the rationale of prior holdings
which had denied state control over the travel of foreign immigrants2s
early held to include "the right of a citizen of one State to pass through or to reside
in any other State, for the purpose of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or
otherwise. . . " Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.ED. Pa. 1823)
(dictum declaring a state statute impeding economic activity by outsiders void). Was
this a right to travel case, or was it decided under principles since recognized in the
commerce clause?
The Constitution was viewed as intended to inhibit "discriminating legislation against
[citizens] by other States; it gives [American citizens] the right of free ingress into
other States and egress from them . .. 2' Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180
(1868). See 2 J. STORY, ComimNv rARiEs ON THE CoNsrTrunoN OF Tmm UNrnTm STATES,
§ 1804-06, n.4(a) (5th ed., 1891). However, the early cases erroneously envisioned
the right to travel as an incident of state citizenship. See Edwards v. California, 314
US. 160, 180 (1941) (concurring opinion). Principal among these early cases were
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.ED. Pa. 1823); Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868); and Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430
(1870).
2173 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
22 The post-civil war setting of Crandall has been accurately characterized as an era
of re-establishment and exploratory assertion of lately challenged national power over
state actions. In Crandall, the Supreme Court held that the newly admitted state of
Nevada could not impose a tax on a person leaving the state by railroad, stage coach,
or vehicle transporting for hire, because the person's right to leave was an attribute of
his national citizenship. 2 C. WARREN, THE SuPRE ME COURT I N UN STATES HiSToRY
415 (rev. ed. 1926). The nature of this national citizenship was perhaps best defined
by listing the distinctions between it and state citizenship. It was believed to be as
different from state citizenship as the functions of the two governments are different
from each other. 2 T. CoorEY, CoNsTIToUONAL LvrrrATioNs, 822, n.1 (8th ed. 1927).
Assuming, in line with the judicial opinions of the era, that the envisioned function
of the federal government was the redevelopment and extension of unity among the
states, the holding in Crandall seems thoroughly justified on policy grounds.
That the Supreme Court entertained vivid memories of the Civil War seems apparent
in the holding which rested in part on the general proposition that the national
government had at all times the right to require the services of its citizens at the
seat of government and that they had the correlative right to visit the seat of govern-
ment. In Crandall, the federal government protected its power to transport troops by
the most expeditions method. Had the Court held differently, this power would have
existed at the mercy of any state through which the individual might be required to
pass. While these policy grounds may have further strengthened the decision in 1868,
the right to travel is not now limited to the transportation of soldiers. See Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). But see United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 299
(1920).
2aThe Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1848). In Henderson v. Mayor of
New York, 92 U.S. 259, 266 (1875), it was suggested that the decision in The Passenger
Cases turned on the commerce clause. The majority of the Court in Crandall did not'
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to the interstate travel of American citizens..2 4 Its principles have found
periodic reaffirmation by the Supreme Court for over a century.25 In
this process of evolution, the right to travel has come to be regarded as
a privilege or immunity of citizenship protected from state infringe-
ment by the fourteenth amendment. 6
adopt this view. See also City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837)
(dissenting opinion).
24The most significant extracts of The Passenger Cases, as viewed by Crandall, were
those advanced by the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Taney. The Chief Justice
believed that a state tax on foreigners was valid, but a similar tax on American citizens
would be void. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 464 (1848). The Court in
Crandall relied in part on Taney's observations as to American citizens.
25 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). See New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1,
6-8, 12-16 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941)
(concurring opinion); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Williams v.
Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900). But see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
2 6 See cases cited note 12 supra. It has been suggested that while Crandall v. Nevada
was not decided under the then nonexistent fourteenth amendment, its provisions are
now translatable as privileges and immunities thereunder. CONSTITUTION OF THM UNrr=
STATEs OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
1078 (1964). But see Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940), overruling Colgate
v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), the Court indicated that the
"constitutional right to travel from one State to another .. . occupies a position funda-
mental to the concept of our Federal Union. Although there have been recurring
differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right
of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All have
agreed the right exists .... We reaffirm it now." Id. at 757, 759.
Guest appears to constitute conclusive recognition that in 1966, the century-old doc-
trine propounded by Crandall under different circumstances (Civil War reconstruc-
tion) and for different reasons (uniting a federation of independent states versus
protecting the personal civil rights of a citizen) retained its full validity and force
as a vehicle for individual relief against governmental oppression. This result is
suggested not only by the majority opinion, but in the concurring opinion of
Justice Clark, joined in by Justices Black and Fortas, wherein agreement with the
majority position against state interference with the right to travel is indicated. Id. at
761. Mr. Justice Harlan forcefully agrees that there is an established constitutional
right to travel between states free from unreasonable governmental interference, but
would not extend this protection to deny private interference. Id. at 763. Historically
he regards the Crandall doctrine as a method of breaking down state provincialism
and creating a true federal union. Likewise, the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan,
joined in by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, implies acceptance of the
right to travel as constitutionally protected. Id. at 767.
In Guest, the majority of the Court relied in part on the earlier case of United
States v. Moore, 129 F. 630 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904) for explicit recognition of the right.
However, the statement in Moore cited neither constitutional nor judicial authority
and was dictum.
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The concurring opinion in Crandall, based upon the commerce clause,
presaged the eventual majority application of the commerce clause to
the carriage of interstate passengers.2 7 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme
Court stated that "commerce among the States ... includes the trans-
portation of persons .... ,, 28 This view prevails today, with the result
that state taxation of interstate passenger transportation is restricted,
but not entirely denied, under the commerce clause.29 It was earlier
believed that the judicial expansion of the commerce clause had tolled
the demise of Crandall as a limitation on state power to tax.30 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has in the last three decades twice resurrected
the principle enunciated in Crandall, indicating that it is still viable
and translatable as a privilege or immunity of citizenship guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. 1 The court has shown an apparent willing-
27 Whether the carriage of persons from one state to another was a branch of
interstate commerce was a question the Supreme Court was able to side-step in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the earliest and possibly the most
lucid statement of the guiding principle whereby the Court could adjust the powers
of the states under the commerce clause. See CoxsrrrunoN OF THE UmarE STATES OF
AzmRicA-AwALYSiS AD INDErPmRETATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1964).
It was suggested in The Passenger Cases that the carriage of persons across a state line
was commerce. That decision, however, dealt only with foreign immigrants and rested
largely upon treaties and acts of Congress.
In 1872 in the leading case delineating the rights of a state to tax interstate commerce,
the Court held that the transportation of passengers was a subject of interstate com-
merce. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
28 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885). This is the
present status of the law. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 423 (1919); Hoke v.
United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky,
154 U.S. 204 (1894). See also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936); Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). For a time it was believed that the right to travel
doctrine had been rejected in favor of the commerce clause. Helson v. Kentucky,
279 U.S. 245, 251 (1929); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 436 (1935) (dissenting
opinion). Colgate was subsequently overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93
(1940). In the light of subsequent cases this has proven to be untrue. See cases cited
note 16 supra.29 See Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947); Central Greyhound Lines,
Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948) (dictum indicating that a state may tax that appor-
tioned part of and interstate journey occurring within its borders). In the field of state
taxation of interstate commerce, the Court has been viewed as an abiter, serving a
quasi-legislative function. CoNswiTrrloN OF TH Umnxn STATES OF AM~mEcA-ANALysis
A m NTEREATiON, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 209 (1964). See also P. HART-
MdAN, STATE TAxATiox OF INRsTATE COMmERCE (1953).3o See cases cited note 8 supra.
31 See cases cited note 14 supra.
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ness to expand rather than curtail its applicability to protect an inter-
state traveller from the threats of discriminatory restriction.2
The commerce clause has been regarded as a better limiter of state
interference with interstate passengers because it offers a longer tradi-
tion of decisional law and more refined principles of adjudication.
Furthermore, the constitutional limitations on a state's power to tax
under the commerce clause lack the absolutism characteristic of the
right to travel. The court assumes a quasi-legislative power in deciding
such cases on their individual merits.33
The due process clause34 has recently gained judicial recognition as
a third alternative for preventing state and individual interference with
the right to travel.35 However, its applicability is neither so definite nor
so well established as that of the privileges and immunities or commerce
clauses. 36 The court has not had occasion to decide whether a state
tax on interstate travel violates due process.
In Northwest, the Montana court could have relied on the com-
merce clause or the due process clause, but the decision, reached in
affirmation of the right to travel, is correct. It relies on the firmly estab-
lished and presently viable principle that any state taxation of an inter-
state traveller's entry or departure violates the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has re-
cently decided similar cases under both the privileges and immunities
and the commerce clauses, but it has not repudiated one in adoption of
the other. Both constitutional provisions safeguard the individual from
essentially the same apprehended evil-the imposition of crippling
cumulative burdens on any movement that necessitates crossing state
lines. The Montana court recognized that the power to tax encompassed
the ultimate capacity to prohibit departure entirely, ruling that "the
ban on state action in this area must be absolute .... , 37
If extended beyond the facts presented in Northwest, however, it is
doubtful that the absolute character of the right to travel, as it has
presently evolved, will benefit the majority of citizens. It is conceded
32 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 768 (1966).
33 See note 8 supra.
U. S. Const. amend. XIV.
35 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 768 (1966).
36 The due process concept as envisioned by Chafee appears to gain Supreme Court
recognition only in Guest.
87 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., - Mont. -, 463 P.2d
470, 473 (1970).
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that a state should not be allowed to take advantage of its chance posi-
tion astride the normal channels of interstate movement to swell its cof-
fers at the ultimate expense of the interstate traveller. There is at present,
however, neither judicial nor legislative precedent that limits the im-
munity offered by the right to travel to immunity from taxation alone.
Rather, there are indicia that the states are bound not to restrict ingress
and egress in any way whatsoever. It is not difficult to imagine the
myriad circumstances in which a person's unrestrained entry into a
state might gravely imperil the physical well-being of its present in-
habitants. If the absolute character of the right to travel guarantees an
individual that he will not be denied entry into any state, though he
may be infected with a highly contagious disease, or possess other
contaminative powers (such as radioactivity) which would make him
a threat to the life and safety of a large segment of the state's popu-
lation, then the harm it threatens may well outweigh the benefit it
guarantees.
Limitations should be placed upon the right to travel to ward off the
threats its absolute character poses. The rights of each state's citizens
should be given protection equal to that given the traveller. A stipula-
tion that the state should have no power to tax an interstate traveller's
act of entry into, passage through, or departure from its borders clearly
does not imply an admission that it should otherwise have no power
to restrict such acts when the public good demands. At present, there
are no grounds upon which any restriction by the states may be deemed
a valid limitation on the right to travel. Until the right to travel has
been tempered to allow a balancing of the various interests affected
by its exercise, its application to restrict the regulatory powers of the
states should be carefully circumscribed.
1. D. F. III
1970]
